affeCTIo
‘Affectio’ is based on the 'Definitions of the Emotions' (Affectuum Defenitiones) from the third part of the Ethics of Baruch de
Spinoza. It is intended as a study for a larger work entitled ' The Strange Death of Baruch de Spinoza'.

The sound world of the composition ‘affectio ’ is made up of the voice and harpsichord (a setting of the latin text), paper sounds ,wax falling on paper , glass-sine tones , and manipulated samples of fragments of the piece.
The intention is that the electronics create a sense of a living organism; an image of the physical . A body of slowly transforming states that constantly move between the material world and the mental world (‘idea and extension’).
From the high-pitched sine tones of the cerebral cortex to the image of a lung, a heart, breathing paper, blood coursing through the veins; the connection between the rational world of the latin definitions and the visceral experience of emotion as a physically experienced phenomena.

Spinoza wrote the Ethics in the final years of his life living in exile in Den Haag in the mid to late17th century.
It is an audacious work and was far too radical to be published in his lifetime as it sets out to define in a geometric form a metaphysics of God, man and the universe without recourse to religious archetypes and accepted moral beliefs.
In the third part of the Ethics (the other parts concern God, the mind, human bondage and freedom) he sets out to explain emotions as determined in their occurrence as are the laws of motion.
‘Our effects follow from the same necessity and force of nature as the other singular things.’
He divides these into actions and passions.
When the cause of an event lies in our own nature then it is a case of the mind acting. When something happens in us of which the cause is outside our nature then we are passive and being acted upon. What takes place when we are acting or being acted upon is a change in our mental and physical capacities: ‘an increase or decrease in our power of acting’
The essence of all things is ‘conatus’ (desire):
‘Each thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to persevere in its being’.
An affect is any change in this power for better or for worse.
Affects that are actions are changes in this power that have their source in our nature alone, affects that are passions are those changes in this power that originate outside of us.
The complex model of human emotion that he builds up from the primary affects of desire, pleasure (‘the transition from a lesser to a greater perfection’) and pain (‘the transition from a greater to lesser perfection’) gives a model of emotions as a constant changing flux of states , in a literal sense: movements, that have the net effect of either increasing or decreasing a man’s power of acting.


Definitions of the Emotions


Desire is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived, as determined to a particular activity by some modification of itself


Pleasure is the transition of a man from a less to a greater perfection


Pain is the transition of a man from a greater to a less perfection


Wonder is the conception of anything, wherein the mind comes to a stand, because the particular concept in question has no connection with other concepts


Contempt is the conception of anything which touches the mind so little, that its presence leads the mind to imagine those qualities which are not in it rather than such as are in it


Love
is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external cause


Hatred is pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause


Inclination is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of something which is accidentally a cause of pleasure


Aversion
is pain, accompanied by the idea of something which is accidentally a cause of pain


Devotion
is love towards one whom we admire


Derision
is pleasure arising from our conceiving the presence of a quality, which we despise, in an object which we hate

Hope is an inconsistent pleasure, arising from the idea of something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue


Fear
is an inconsistent pain arising from the idea of something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue


Confidence
is pleasure arising from the idea of something past or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed


Despair is pain arising from the idea of something past or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed


Joy is pleasure accompanied by the idea of something past, which has had an issue beyond our hope


Disappointment is pain accompanied by the idea of something past, which has had an issue contrary to our hope


Pity
is pain accompanied by the ida of evil, which has befallen someone else whom we conceive to be like ourselves


Approval is love towards one who has done good to another


Indignation is hatred towards one who has done evil to another


Partiality
is thinking too highly of anyone because of the love we bare him


Disparagement
is thinking too meanly of anyone , because we hate him


Envy is hatred, in so far as it induces a man to be pained by another’s good fortune, and to rejoice in another’s evil fortune


Sympathy
is love, in so far as it induces a man to feel pleasure at another’s good fortune and pain at another’s evil fortune


Self-approval is pleasure arising from a man’s contemplation of himself and his own power of action


Humility
is pain arising from a man’s contemplation of his own weakness of body or mind


Repentance
is pain accompanied by the idea of some action, which we believe we have performed by the free decision of our mind


Pride is thinking too highly of one’s self from self-love


Self-abasement is thinking too meanly of one’s self by reason of pain


Honour
is pleasure accompanied by the idea of some action of our own, which we believe to be praised by others


Shame
is pain accompanied by the idea of some action of our own, which we believe to be blamed by others


Regret is the desire or appetite to possess something, kept alive by the
remembrance of the said thing, and at the same time constrained by the remembrance of other things which exclude the existence of it


Emulation is the desire of something, engendered in us by our conception that other have the same desire


Thankfulness
is the desire or zeal springing from love, whereby we endeavour to benefit him, who with similar feelings of love has conferred a benefit on us

Benevolence
is the desire of benefiting one whom we pity


Anger
is the desire, whereby through hatred we are induced to injure one whom we hate


Revenge
is the desire whereby we are induced, through mutual hatred , to injure one who, with similar feelings, has injured us



Cruelty
is the desire whereby a man is impelled to injure one who we love or pity


Timidity is the desire to avoid a greater evil, which we dread, by undergoing a lesser evil


Daring
is the desire whereby a man is set on to do something dangerous which his equals fear to attempt


Cowardice is attributed to one, whose desire is checked by the fear of some danger which his equals dare to encounter


Consternation
is attributed to one, whose desire of avoiding evil is checked by amazement at the evil which he fears


Courtesy is the desire of acting in a way that should please men, and refraining from that which should displease them


Luxury is excessive desire or even love of living sumptuously


Intemperance is the excessive desire and love of drinking


Avarice
is the excessive desire and love of riches


Lust is desire and love in the matter of sexual intercourse

devotio (devotion)
desperatio (despair)
favor e indignatio (approval and indignation)
Baruch de Spinoza (1632-1677)
performance history:

to be premierd by Ayelet Harpaz and Zohar Shefi in the KORZO theatre Den Haag 8.12.2000 with further performances in Amsterdam (Stedelijk Museum) Middelburg (Centrum Nieuwe Muziek) Utrecht (Kikker) and Tel Aviv.

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