spinoza (or I am not where I think myself to be)

Electric music theatre for voice, harpsichord, percussion, live electronics and two actors.

The music of spinoza is comprised of two separate parts of about 45 minutes each based respectively on the definitions of the emotions from the 3rd part of the “Ethics”, and on a letter about free will. The sound world is made up of voice and harpsichord (setting of the Latin text), percussion (paper and skin) , glass-sine tones , live sample manipulation of the singer and actors voices as well, raw wave based electronic sounds. The actors have a musical function in the work in the way their voices are used and the text is interpreted.

Organisms within the music are created whereby the polyphony of voices have an interactive affect on each other through live computer processing using algorithms with feedback loops, whereby one voice will influence the level of processing used on another. The physicality of the electronic sounds play an important function in the music as it highlights the gray area between the corporeal, sensual presence of sound in a space, and on the other hand its abstraction into a codified social language; this is fertile territory for music-theatre and is one of the more direct influences from Spinoza’s philosophy. Another is the way in which changes in tempo and velocity are used to connect different layers of polyphony, different states of activity and non-activity.

Naturally one of the inspirations behind this work was the compositional beauty of Spinoza's “Ethics” itself. The form and structure of this book can almost be seen as music in its own right, in the rigorous repetition and development of singular motifs, and of the cutting between the different voices of the propositions, the scholiae, and the explanations.

Premiere of the ZTHollandia production in old ABN headquarters in Kneuterdijk, Den Haag.
Photos: Ben van Duin.
  • Direction: Paul Koek
  • Artwork: Isaac Carlos
  • Musicians: Tatiana Koleva - percussion, Ayelet Harpaz - voice, Anne Faulborn - harpsichord
  • Actors: Carola Arons and Bert Luppes

performance history

  • Premiered by ZTHollandia in old ABN headquarters in Kneuterdijk, Den Haag.
  • 20 - 30 November 2002; Lange Winkelhaakstraat 26, Antwerpen.
  • 5 - 14 December 2002; Kneuterdijk 1, Den Haag.

The CD is available from Unsounds.

Thing Like Us CD Cover

definitions of the emotions

  • Desire is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived, as determined to a particular activity by some modification of itself.
  • Pleasure is the transition of a man from a less to a greater perfection.
  • Pain is the transition of a man from a greater to a less perfection.
  • Wonder is the conception of anything, wherein the mind comes to a stand, because the particular concept in question has no connection with other concepts.
  • Contempt is the conception of anything which touches the mind so little, that its presence leads the mind to imagine those qualities which are not in it rather than such as are in it.
  • Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external cause.
  • Hatred is pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause.
  • Inclination is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of something which is accidentally a cause of pleasure.
  • Aversion is pain, accompanied by the idea of something which is accidentally a cause of pain.
  • Devotion is love towards one whom we admire.
  • Derision is pleasure arising from our conceiving the presence of a quality, which we despise, in an object which we hate.
  • Hope is an inconsistent pleasure, arising from the idea of something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue.
  • Fear is an inconsistent pain arising from the idea of something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue.
  • Confidence is pleasure arising from the idea of something past or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.
  • Despair is pain arising from the idea of something past or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.
  • Joy is pleasure accompanied by the idea of something past, which has had an issue beyond our hope.
  • Disappointment is pain accompanied by the idea of something past, which has had an issue contrary to our hope.
  • Pity is pain accompanied by the ida of evil, which has befallen someone else whom we conceive to be like ourselves.
  • Approval is love towards one who has done good to another.
  • Indignation is hatred towards one who has done evil to another.
  • Partiality is thinking too highly of anyone because of the love we bare him.
  • Disparagement is thinking too meanly of anyone, because we hate him.
  • Envy is hatred, in so far as it induces a man to be pained by another’s good fortune, and to rejoice in another’s evil fortune.
  • Sympathy is love, in so far as it induces a man to feel pleasure at another’s good fortune and pain at another’s evil fortune.
  • Self-approval is pleasure arising from a man’s contemplation of himself and his own power of action.
  • Humility is pain arising from a man’s contemplation of his own weakness of body or mind.
  • Repentance is pain accompanied by the idea of some action, which we believe we have performed by the free decision of our mind.
  • Pride is thinking too highly of one’s self from self-love.
  • Self-abasement is thinking too meanly of one’s self by reason of pain.
  • Honour is pleasure accompanied by the idea of some action of our own, which we believe to be praised by others.
  • Shame is pain accompanied by the idea of some action of our own, which we believe to be blamed by others.
  • Regret is the desire or appetite to possess something, kept alive by the remembrance of the said thing, and at the same time constrained by the remembrance of other things which exclude the existence of it.
  • Emulation is the desire of something, engendered in us by our conception that other have the same desire.
  • Thankfulness is the desire or zeal springing from love, whereby we endeavour to benefit him, who with similar feelings of love has conferred a benefit on us.
  • Benevolence is the desire of benefiting one whom we pity.
  • Anger is the desire, whereby through hatred we are induced to injure one whom we hate.
  • Revenge is the desire whereby we are induced, through mutual hatred , to injure one who, with similar feelings, has injured us.
  • Cruelty is the desire whereby a man is impelled to injure one who we love or pity.
  • Timidity is the desire to avoid a greater evil, which we dread, by undergoing a lesser evil.
  • Daring is the desire whereby a man is set on to do something dangerous which his equals fear to attempt.
  • Cowardice is attributed to one, whose desire is checked by the fear of some danger which his equals dare to encounter.
  • Consternation is attributed to one, whose desire of avoiding evil is checked by amazement at the evil which he fears.
  • Courtesy is the desire of acting in a way that should please men, and refraining from that which should displease them.
  • Luxury is excessive desire or even love of living sumptuously.
  • Intemperance is the excessive desire and love of drinking.
  • Avarice is the excessive desire and love of riches.
  • Lust is desire and love in the matter of sexual intercourse.

Correspondence / 58 (62). Spinoza to Schüller

  • 1. Though I am, at present, much occupied with other matters, not to mention my delicate health, your singular courtesy, or, to name the chief motive, your love of truth, impels me to satisfy your inquiries, as far as my poor abilities will permit.
  • 2. I say that a thing is free, which exists and acts solely by the necessity of its own nature.
  • 3. Thus also God understands Himself and all things freely, because it follows solely from the necessity of His nature, that He should understand all things.
  • 4. You see I do not place freedom in free decision, but in free necessity.
  • 5. However, let us descend to created things, which are all determined by external causes to exist and operate in a given determinate manner.
  • 6. In order that this may be clearly understood, let us conceive a very simple thing.
  • 7. For instance, a stone receives from the impulsion of an external cause, a certain quantity of motion,
  • 8. by virtue of which it continues to move after the impulsion given by the external cause has ceased.
  • 9. The permanence of the stone's motion is constrained, not necessary, because it must be defined by the impulsion of an external cause.
  • 10. What is true of the stone is true of any individual, however complicated its nature, or varied its functions,
  • 11. inasmuch as every individual thing is necessarily determined by some external cause to exist and operate in a fixed and determinate manner.
  • 12. Further conceive, I beg, that a stone, while continuing in motion, should be capable of thinking and knowing, that it is endeavouring, as far as it can, to continue to move.
  • 13. Such a stone, being conscious merely of its own endeavour and not at all indifferent, would believe itself to be completely free,
  • 14. and would think that it continued in motion solely because of its own wish.
  • 15. This is that human freedom, which all boast that they possess,
  • 16. and which consists solely in the fact, that men are conscious of their own desire, but are ignorant of the causes whereby that desire has been determined.
  • 17. Thus an infant believes that it desires milk freely;
  • 18. an angry child thinks he wishes freely for vengeance,
  • 19. a timid child thinks he wishes freely to run away.
  • 20. Again, a drunken man thinks, that from the free decision of his mind he speaks words,
  • 21. which afterwards, when sober, he would like to have left unsaid.
  • 22. So the delirious, the garrulous, and others of the same sort think that they act from the free decision of their mind,
  • 23. not that they are carried away by impulse.
  • 24. As this misconception is innate in all men, it is not easily conquered.
  • 25. For, although experience abundantly shows, that men can do anything rather than check their desires,
  • 26. and that very often, when a prey to conflicting emotions, they see the better course and follow the worse,
  • 27. they yet believe themselves to be free;
  • 28. because in some cases their desire for a thing is slight,
  • 29. and can easily be overruled by the recollection of something else, which is frequently present in the mind.
  • 30. I have thus, if I mistake not, sufficiently explained my opinion regarding free and constrained necessity,
  • 31. and also regarding so- called human freedom:
  • 32. from what I have said you will easily be able to reply to your friend's objections.